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Abstract 
The theory predicts that IPRs tend to raise income inequality by generating a more skewed distribution of 
wages. Stronger IPRs increase the demand for skilled labor force as it raises the return on R&D activities. 
This causes a relative increase in skilled labor wages, creating a wage bias in favor of skilled labor against 
unskilled labor, thus aggravating income inequality within a country. Using dynamic panel data 
techniques and a sample of 60 countries over 1980-2011, we examine the impact of strengthening 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) on income distribution of a country. Our results indicate that contrary 
to findings of previous research, strengthening of IPRs reduces income disparities within a country. 
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1. Introduction 
Intellectual Property (IP) refers to products or ideas that are creations of an individual’s mind. Intellectual 
Property Right (IPR) refers to the legal right conferred on the holder of such ideas for exclusive use of its 
intellectual capital. The increased globalization of markets has made it possible for firms to sell their 
products in other countries and to choose foreign destinations for production and investment purposes. 
But this benefit has come at a cost, as globalization has also made it easier for intellectual property to be 
accessed and copied (through imitation or reverse engineering) in countries that provide weaker IPR 
protection.  
This consideration has led to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs), a product of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of trade negotiations. The TRIPs Agreement, for 
the first time, provides for certain minimum standards for protection and enforcement of IPRs among the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries. The Agreement provides varied conditions for 
different areas of IP. Basically, it covers seven areas of IPR, which include copyright, patents, 
trademarks, industrial designs, geographical indications, semiconductor topographies and undisclosed 
information. In light of the development goals of member countries, the Agreement has set differentiated 
timelines across countries, depending on their level of development. Developing countries have been 
given additional time to implement the applicable changes to their national IP laws, basically in terms of  
two tiers of transition. The transition period for developing countries expired in 2005, that is to say that 
these became fully TRIPs compliant. In comparison, the transition period for the least developed 
countries (LDCs) to become TRIPs compliant was extended to 1 July, 2013 and further until 1 January 
2016 for the pharmaceutical patents, with the possibility of further extension. 4  The TRIPs Council 
comprising of all WTO members, agreed on 11 June, 2013 to extend this deadline to 1 July 2021 for the 
LDCs to protect IP under the WTO’s TRIPs agreement, with a further extension possible when the time 
comes.5 
Following the TRIPs Agreement, a body of research has now emerged that focuses on the potential 
impact of TRIPs and IPRs on international technology transfer and diffusion, economic growth and 
welfare. Most of the theoretical literature that analyzes welfare implications of IPRs has come to the 
conclusion that North (developed countries) tends to benefit and South (developing countries) loses in 
terms of welfare due to more stringent IPR protection in the South (Helpman 1993; Lai 1997; Grossman 
and Lai 2005; Chu and Peng 2011). The channels of technology transfer and the ability of the South to 
take advantage of the technology to which it is exposed play a major role in ascertaining welfare 
implications of stronger IPRs. However, a major drawback of these studies is that, barring a few, most of 
them do not consider the distributional consequences of IPRs while evaluating the impact of IPRs on 
overall welfare. IPRs can affect income distribution of a country through a direct channel, for example, 
through wage distribution. Stronger patent rights can increase wage inequality by increasing the return to 
                                                          
4 WTO recognizes LDCs as countries which have been designated as such by the United Nations.  Countries are 
classified as Least developed based on their Gross national income per capita, Human Assets index and Economic 
Vulnerability index.(For details,  see  
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_criteria.shtml#criteria ) 
5 It does not exempt the LDCs entirely from applying the TRIPs agreement. It does give them the freedom to choose 
whether or not to protect trademarks, patents, copyright, industrial designs, geographical indications or any other 
form of intellectual property covered by the agreement. If they do protect it and several do have some intellectual 
property laws, then they have to apply provisions on non-discrimination. But this extension of transition period does 
not cover the patents on pharmaceuticals. The  separate transition period for least developed countries to protect 
patents on pharmaceuticals remains the same.(Source -www.wto.org) 
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research and development (R&D) and the wage rates of R&D workers, who are mostly skilled labor 
(Cozzi and Galli 2009). More stringent IPRs can also raise income inequality indirectly via differences in 
income growth rates. For instance, Chu and Peng (2011) postulate that strengthening of IPRs spurs 
growth rates, which raises disparities in wealth distribution, leading to an increase in income inequality. A 
higher growth rate increases the real interest rates through the Euler equation. Higher real interest rates 
imply higher return on assets. This higher return on assets increases the income of the asset-wealthy 
households relative to the asset-poor households in each country. 
As far as empirical studies are concerned, there exist several that focus on the relationship between IPRs 
and economic growth (Gould and Gruben 1996; Thompson and Rushing 1996, 1999; Falvey, Foster and 
Greenaway 2006; Schneider 2005). However, to the best of our knowledge, there exists only one study 
that examines the relationship between IPRs and income inequality, which is by Adams (2008). Adams 
(2008) examines the relationship between IPRs and income inequality for a cross-section of 62 
developing countries over a period of 17 years (1985-2001). He finds that strengthening of IPRs produces 
a significantly worsening effect on income inequality, implying that income inequality is raised.  
The motivation for this paper stems from the fact that a higher economic growth prospect due to 
strengthening of IPRs loses its relevance if the benefits of higher growth are reaped only by a section of 
the society or concentrated in a group within the economy. Given that income inequality is a social 
concern, these distributional consequences should also be taken into consideration while studying the 
welfare implications of IPRs. The objective of our study is to fill this significant gap in the literature on 
IPRs by formally studying the distributional consequences of strengthening of IPRs on both developed 
and developing countries. 
Since the TRIPs agreement requires WTO members to meet certain minimum standards of IP protection 
within a stipulated period of time, the onus of harmonization of IPRs largely falls on developing member 
countries. In light of this, it will be interesting to study how the enforcement of a stronger IPR regime has 
affected income-inequality in these developing countries. Since, barring one study (i.e. by Adams 2008), 
almost all the existing studies that examine the impact of IPRs on income-inequality are theoretical in 
nature (see, for instance Chu and Peng (2011), Chu (2009a)), we intend to contribute to the existing 
literature on IPRs and income-inequality by carrying out an empirical investigation of the subject. We 
believe that, in comparison to Adams (2008), our study is an improvement in at least three specific ways. 
First, it includes both developing and developed countries in the sample. The empirical analysis has been 
conducted on an unbalanced panel of 60 developed and developing countries. The aim is to study the 
impact of strengthening IPRs on income inequality in both developed and developing countries, and also 
check whether the effect on income inequality is different between the two groups of countries. Second, 
the analysis covers the time period 1980-2011, which is more relevant as it overlaps with the timeline of 
compliance with TRIPs Agreement by the developing countries. Thirdly, this is a first study to employ 
GMM estimation technique to investigate the relation between IPRs and income distribution in a dynamic 
panel setting. As discussed in later sections, GMM estimates are more reliable and consistent as this 
method can take care of endogeneity bias as well as omitted variable bias, both of which are a serious 
concern in a dynamic unbalanced panel study. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature on the subject. Section 3 describes the data and methodology used in the paper. Section 4 
presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Literature review  
While there exists substantial body of theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of IPRs on 
economic growth (Helpman 1993; Lai 1997; Grossman and Lai 2004; Falvey, Foster, & Greenaway 
2006; Schneider 2005), the studies that focus on the IPR–income inequality relationship are rather 
limited. Moreover, most of these attempt theoretical analyses of the issue. 
Chu and Peng (2011) study the effects of IPR protection on income inequality across countries. They 
develop a two-country R&D-based growth model with wealth heterogeneity among households. In the 
model, both the North and the South invest in R&D, but North has a higher degree of innovative 
capability than South. Within this framework, they derive the following results. Firstly, strengthening 
patent protection in either country increases both countries’ (a) economic growth by increasing R&D and 
(b) income inequality by raising the return on assets. They also derive the pre-TRIPs Nash equilibrium 
level of patent protection that is sub-optimally low as it ignores cross-country spillovers of patent 
protection. Also, North chooses a higher level of patent protection than  South and imposing the North’s 
higher level of patent protection on the South, as required by TRIPs agreement, increases (decreases) 
welfare in the North (the South). The authors find that there exists a critical level of cross-country 
spillover below (above) which global welfare is lower (higher) under TRIPs. This varying degree of 
cross-country spillover is captured by the importance of foreign goods in the domestic consumption 
basket. In the Nash equilibrium, the degree of the positive externality is determined by this structural 
parameter. When the share of foreign goods in domestic consumption is small, the cross-country 
spillovers of innovation are small as well. In this case, imposing the North’s level of patent protection on 
the South makes the South worse off without making the North much better off, as both North and South 
are almost in a situation of autarky. Innovation in the North will not lead to a large increase in monopoly 
profits if foreign goods are not demanded in the South. Therefore, North will not be much better off and, 
as explained above, South is also worse-off due to deviation from its first-best response. Therefore, global 
welfare reduces unambiguously, if the share of foreign goods in domestic consumption is small.  
Chu (2009a) also analyses the distributional consequences of patent policy in the United States, but 
considers the effects on income and consumption inequality arising due to an unequal distribution of 
wealth among the households. His model predicts that strengthening patent protection increases (a) 
economic growth by stimulating R&D investment, and (b) income inequality by raising the return on 
assets. Strengthening patent protection raises R&D as well as the equilibrium growth rate that drives up 
the rate of return on assets. This higher return on assets increases the income of asset-wealthy households 
relative to that of asset-poor households. However, whether it also increases consumption inequality 
depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. If this elasticity is less (greater) 
than unity, strengthening patent protection would increase (decrease) consumption inequality. 
Furthermore, the allowance of elastic labor supply creates an additional effect on income inequality 
through labor income.  
As far as empirical studies are concerned, there exists only one empirical study so far, which analyses the 
income-distributional consequences of stronger IPRs. Adams (2008) examines the relationship between 
IPRs and income inequality for a cross-section of 62 developing countries over a period of 17 years 
(1985-2001). The strength of IPRs in a country is measured by the Ginarte and Park index and income 
inequality is measured by the Gini index.6 He estimates a system of four equations using the seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR) method. The results of the study indicate that globalization explains only 
                                                          
6 The Gini index is measured as the Gini coefficient multiplied by 100. The Gini coefficient is a ratio with values 
between 0 and 1, with 0 representing perfect income equality and 1 being perfect inequality. The income inequality 
data is obtained from Chen, Datt and Ravallion (2004) POVCAL software, maintained on the World Bank’s 
website. 
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15% of the variance in income inequality. Stronger IPRs are positively correlated with income inequality. 
That is, increasing the Ginarte and Park IPR index by one (on a scale of zero to five) is associated with an 
increase in the Gini coefficient of 0.01 to 0.02 (on a scale of zero to one) in developing countries.  
A major conclusion that can be drawn from this (rather limited) existing literature is that strengthening of 
IPRs has far-reaching effects on income distribution within a country. The distributional aspects of IPRs 
have not been studied in depth at all. This is a significant gap in the existing research.  There is a need to 
study this aspect of debate on IPRs and welfare more closely. Our study constitutes a small yet important 
step in this direction. We propose to go beyond Adams (2008) in two specific ways. First, Adams 
(2008)’s study analyzed the impact of more stringent IPRs on income inequality in developing countries 
alone for the period of 1985-2001. During this period, TRIPs agreement had just about come into 
existence (on 1st January, 1995) under WTO, and developing countries had not begun to modify their 
domestic IPR regimes in compliance with the TRIPs agreement. We improve upon this by, firstly, taking 
the period of the study as 1980-2011, which corresponds to the time span when the developing countries 
actually started the process of complying with the TRIPs requirement. This helps us to capture more 
effectively the impact of strengthening IPRs. Secondly, The TRIPs agreement requires WTO members to 
meet certain minimum standards within a stipulated period of time, therefore, the burden of harmonizing 
the IPR system across countries largely falls on the shoulders of developing member countries as TRIPs 
agreement specifies the minimum standards to be fulfilled based on those enforced in developed 
countries. Thus, there is a possibility that the effect of stronger IPRs on income distribution in developed 
countries may not be too distortionary. An investigation of this possibility requires empirical 
substantiation that covers both developed and developing countries in the analysis.  Adams’s (2008) study 
focuses on the relationship between IPRs and income inequality in developing countries alone. We 
include both developed and developing countries in the study, which allows us to bring out more starkly 
the differences in the income-distributions implications of stronger IP protection between the two groups 
of countries. 
The following sections include a discussion on the data sources used in the study, the specific empirical 
relationship being estimated, and the associated hypotheses to be tested.    
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The data have been obtained from various sources. Most of the data are obtained from the World 
Development Indicators, World Bank. A set of 60 countries (27 developed and 33 developing), have been 
chosen for our analysis which cover the time period 1980-2011.The sample of countries is diverse, 
representing different income groups and regions7. 
The most widely used measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient (Gini index). Its value 
typically ranges from 0 to 1(100). A low Gini coefficient (Gini index) indicates a more equal distribution, 
with 0 corresponding to complete equality, while a higher value of the Gini coefficients (Gini indices) 
indicates more unequal distribution, with 1 (100 on the percentile scale) corresponding to complete 
inequality. Gini coefficient can be calculated in several ways-for gross income (before taxes and 
transfers), net income (after taxes and transfers) and consumption expenditure. The unit of analysis can be 
individual or household. The lack of comparable Gini coefficients -- both between countries and over 
time -- has long been a major obstacle in research on inequality. The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) is 
considered to be the most reliable source of cross-nationally comparable income inequality data. The LIS 
provides inequality statistics calculated using a uniform set of assumptions and definitions on the basis of 
                                                          
7 The countries included in the sample are listed in the Annexure A. 
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microdata from national household income surveys. Unfortunately, LIS, at present, provides data for only 
41 countries, that too largely rich ones and with very few observations from before 1990. 
The other alternative is the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) created by the World Institute for 
Development Economics Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER). This is an updated 
and expanded version of the Deininger and Squire (1996) dataset. The most recent version (WIID 3c) 
contains 6854 observations on Gini coefficients, covering 179 countries. However, Gini coefficients 
cannot be compared globally due to the differing methodologies in terms of geography, age, population 
covered, welfare definition, equivalence scale within and across countries and large data gaps over time. 
To ensure intertemporal and spatial comparability, Deininger and Squire recommended using only those 
observations that are based on same type of underlying data. But this strategy dramatically reduces the 
number of observations available for analysis. An alternative recommendation is to follow a constant 
adjustment procedure to deal with systematic differences in definition. For instance, Deininger and Squire 
(1996) recommend adding three points to net-income based inequality observations to make them 
comparable with gross-income based inequality observations. Alternatively, one can introduce additive 
dummy variable for those observations that relate to gross-income rather than net-income assuming that 
difference between Gross and Net income inequality measures remain constant over time. However, such 
kind of constant adjustments are fraught with problems. As Bergh (2005) point out that the difference 
between gross and net income Gini coefficients depends on the degree to which taxes and transfers are 
progressive and redistribute income from rich to poor. Consequently, constant adjustment introduces 
systematic errors into the data as the difference varies across countries and over time.  
 The Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) created by Fredrick Solt (Solt 2009) is the 
most comprehensive cross-national database of Gini indices across time. Taking Luxembourg Income 
study as standard, SWIID uses WIID (2.0), World Bank’s PovcalNet and other databases to construct a 
cross-country panel of standardized Gini indices.8Instead of using a constant adjustment procedure to 
account for missing observations, Solt (2009, 2016) use various techniques to estimate the ratios between 
different types of Gini indices, focusing on information about the ratio in the same country nearby in 
time, to increase the number of comparable observations. Overall, the SWIID includes Gini estimates for 
gross and net income inequality for 174 countries from 1960 to 2013.Keeping in mind, the discussion 
above on construction and standardization of income inequality measures, our preferred measure for 
income distribution is the net income Gini index from Solt (2016). As a test of sensitivity, we also use 
gross income Gini index from Solt (2016) as dependent variable.9 
To measure IPRs, we use the Ginarte and Park index, a widely used index for measuring strength of 
patent rights. It has been developed by Park and Ginarte (1997) and extended by Park (2008). Initially, the 
index was constructed for 110 countries quinquennially from 1960 to 1990. But now, index has been 
extended to 122 countries and updated to 2010. Five categories of patent laws have been examined: (1) 
extent of coverage, (2) membership of international patent agreements, (3) provisions for loss of 
protection, (4) enforcement mechanisms, and (5) duration of protection. Each of these categories (per 
country, per time period) scores a value ranging from 0 to 1. These five categories of the index pertain to 
the aggregate economy as a whole. The unweighted sum of these five values constitutes the overall value 
of the patent rights index. The index, therefore, ranges in value from 0 to 5. Higher values of the index 
indicate stronger levels of protection. (See Annexure B for a detailed description of the index). 
 Some other measures of IPR protection do exist in the literature. Hamdan (2009) has constructed an IPR 
index  based on the World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
                                                          
8 http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt/swiid/swiid.html .( Accessed  on 20 December, 2013) 
9 We tried using other inequality measures from WIID for sensitivity analysis but could not get sufficient 
comparable observations on income distribution for running our panel regressions. 
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(TRIPS).Her index tracks TRIPs implementation of 53 developing countries. It is built for all the seven 
IPR categories mentioned in the TRIPS agreement and notes the compliance of each IPR category based 
on whether the legislation in the specified country meets the TRIPs mandated term of protection or not. 
However, her index is available only for the period of 1994-2007 and does not cover developed countries. 
 Another measure of IPR protection is the IP index of Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) of World 
Economic Forum (WEF). GCR’s IP index is based on WEF Executive Opinion Survey and is available 
from 2005. It gauges the perceived strength of IPRs in a particular country on the basis of perceptions of 
the survey’s respondents about IPR protection in respondent’s country. Being a survey-based index, this 
might not be a good choice for cross-country analysis as the index is highly subjective to the questions 
posed and the experts selected. Given these limitations of other IPR indices, Ginarte and Park index is the 
best available option.10 
 
 Besides IPRs, we include a number of other covariates in our specifications that may influence income 
inequality. Globalization is considered as one of the factors affecting income inequality. The exposure of 
countries to international markets is measured by the degree of trade protection, the share of imports 
and/or exports in GDP, the magnitude of capital flows -- FDI in particular, and exchange rate fluctuations 
in the literature on openness and income inequality (Milanovic 2005, Dollar and Kraay 2002, Beer 1999, 
Sylwester 2005, Meschi and Vivarelli 2009). Following this strand of literature, we have included two 
indicators of openness in our model – net FDI inflows as percentage of GDP (FDI) and sum of exports 
and imports of goods and services as percentage of GDP (TRADE OPENNESS).11  
 Thirdly, education should also be taken into account while explaining within-country income inequality.  
An increase in education implies an increase in the supply of skilled labor force, a decrease in the relative 
skilled/ unskilled wage differential and an overall decrease in income inequality (Meschi and Vivarelli 
2009). We have included an indicator of secondary education (SCHOOLING) in our baseline model. 
SCHOOLING measures the level of educational attainment of population in a country. It is defined as 
average years of secondary schooling of population aged 15 years and above. The data for this variable 
has been taken from the Barro-Lee database.12 The baseline model also includes log of real per capita 
GDP to correct for any distributional effects driven by income levels. 
To examine the robustness of our results, we do sensitivity analysis by adding more covariates to our 
baseline specification. Good governance (institutions and policies that enforce property rights and restrain 
government corruption) are associated with lower income inequality (Knack and Anderson 1999). The 
existence of political and civil liberties and higher education levels restrict the ability of a rich minority to 
influence economic policy in its own interest and, therefore, lead to lower income inequality. Keeping 
these findings in mind, we have included two indicators of political rights and civil liberties from 
Freedom in the World report published by Freedom House. Countries are assigned scores from 1 to 7, 
with smaller values assigned to countries with greater liberties. Scores for political rights index are based 
on a checklist of questions broadly covering electoral process, political pluralism and participation, 
                                                          
10 Ideally, it would be appropriate to do correlation analysis of the GP index with other indexes of IPR protection 
and do sensitivity analysis using other measures of IPR. But unfortunately, no other IPR index is available for 
sufficient number of countries and a long enough period to test our hypothesis in panel regressions. Therefore, we 
use the GP index. 
11 Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or 
more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity 
capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of 
payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from 
foreign investors, and is divided by GDP.(Source :World Development Indicators from World Bank) 
12 http://www.barrolee.com/ ( Accessed  on 22 January, 2013).Barro-Lee Dataset provides educational attainment 
data for 146 countries in 5-year intervals from 1950 to 2010 
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functioning of government. Similarly, scores for civil liberties index are based on questions related to 
freedom of expression and belief, rule of law, associational and organizational rights and individual 
rights.  
 Additionally, we test the robustness by incorporating Government consumption expenditure and inflation 
rate in our empirical tests. 13,14 Table 1.1 summarizes the variables used in our analysis. Table 1.2 present 
the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our study.  
Table 1.1 Data definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
 NET INCOME GINI  Gini index on net income  SWIID 5.0  
IPRS  Ginarte and Park Index  Ginarte and Park(1997) and 
Park(2008)  
SCHOOLING Average years of secondary schooling  Barro and Lee(2013)  
PER CAPITA GDP  GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)  World Development Indicators(WDI)  
TRADE OPENNESS Sum of exports and imports (% of GDP ) World Development Indicators(WDI)  
FDI  Net FDI inflows (% of GDP ) World Development Indicators(WDI)  
POLITICAL RIGHTS Political Rights Index  FREEDOM HOUSE  
CIVIL LIBERTIES Civil Liberties Index  FREEDOM HOUSE  
GOVT CONSUMPTION  General Government Final  Consumption 
Expenditure (% of GDP)  
World Development Indicators(WDI)  
INFLATION GDP Deflator (Annual Growth rate %) World Development Indicators(WDI) 
 
 
Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max 
      
Net Income Gini 378 37.79 9.434 19.68 60.43 
Gross Income Gini 378 46.17 6.667 27.03 69.08 
FDI 378 2.709 3.365 -4.310 24.11 
Government Consumption 378 15.53 5.362 4.080 38.68 
Political Rights 378 2.384 1.637 1 7 
Civil Liberties 378 2.660 1.498 1 7 
Inflation 378 28.68 175.8 -6.215 2,523 
Schooling 378 2.705 1.316 0.190 6.840 
IPR 378 2.957 1.207 0.200 4.880 
 Trade Openness 378 72.46 52.34 13.04 410.2 
Per capita GDP 378 14,148 15,089 192.8 59,002 
      
 
 
                                                          
13General government final consumption expenditure (formerly general government consumption) includes all 
government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). It also 
includes most expenditures on national defense and security, but excludes government military expenditures that are 
part of government capital formation.(Source: WDI)  
14 Inflation is measured as the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator.GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of 
GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency. (Source: WDI) 
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3.2 Model Specification 
To analyse the effect of IPRs on income inequality, we formulate the following empirical model: 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2. 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 . 𝐼𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (1)                                                                                                                                  
where i represents each country and t represents each 5 year period. 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 refers to income 
inequality measured by the net income Gini index for country 𝑖 in period 𝑡.The inclusion of lagged value 
of income inequality, 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 accounts for the persistent and path-dependent nature of 
inequality which is affected by institutional and structural factors that are very slow to change. 𝐼𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡  
uses the Ginarte and Park IPRs index. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 include the additional covariates presented above. 𝜇𝑖   is 
idiosyncratic and time-invariant country-specific fixed effect while 𝜃𝑡 is time-specific heterogeneity. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
is a normally distributed error term. 
The data sources and definitions have already been discussed in the previous section. Since Ginarte and 
Park index for intellectual property rights and Barro-Lee education indicators are available 
quinquennially, the most common approach adopted in the existing empirical literature is to use data 
averaged over five-year periods to deal with this problem of missing data (Kanwar 2003).Data is averaged 
in order to remove short-term variation that may obscure the long-term effects, and since the variable of 
main interest – the Ginarte and Park index -- for IPR protection is only available quinquennially. We have 
also adopted the same approach. Our panel comprises of data averaged for seven 5-year time periods.15  
 Eq. (1) is a dynamic panel specification where lagged dependent variable has been included along with 
country level fixed effect (FE). In this case, both OLS and FE estimation yield biased and inconsistent 
estimates.OLS estimation results in upward bias due to the positive correlation between lagged dependent 
variable and fixed effect whereas FE estimation results in downward bias due to negative correlation 
between within-transformed lagged dependent variable and within-transformed error term (Nickell 1981). 
Although as the time dimension T gets large, FE becomes consistent, however T is not very large in our 
study so the presence of “Nickell bias” cannot be denied16. 
Also, the above specification has potential endogeneity problem as causality may run in either direction 
for IPR, FDI and other variables. To cope with these problems and obtain consistent estimates, we 
estimate Eq. (1) using the two-step system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation 
technique.17 This estimator combines the first-differenced regression equations with the level equations in 
a single system. It, then, jointly estimates using first-difference equations instrumented by lagged levels 
of regressors and using level equations instrumented by lagged differences of regressors (see Arellano and 
Bover, 1995, Baltagi, 2008).Generally, system GMM estimator provides consistent estimates in the 
presence of endogenous variables, country-specific effects and in situations with few periods and large 
countries.18 However, the consistency of GMM estimates depends on whether instruments are valid (i.e. 
no correlation between the error term and the instruments) and on the absence of second order serial 
correlation in the first difference of the residuals. Both assumptions are tested using the Sargan-Hansen 
                                                          
15 Except for the last sub-period 2010-2011 which is a two-year sub-period. 
16 We have 7 sub-periods for 60 cross-sectional units. 
17 See Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) for details. In one-step system-GMM, the weighting 
matrix makes use of differenced errors, whereas in the two-step version, the one-step residuals are used to compute a 
new weighting matrix. 
18 The difference GMM estimator can also be used in this context as explained by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
However, the difference GMM estimator often performs poorly when the number of periods, as in our case, is 
limited (Bond et al 2001). Moreover, the difference estimator does not allow for country specific effects.  
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test and Arellano-Bond (AB) test for second-order serial correlation respectively. If system GMM 
properly controls for endogeneity, we expect the coefficient of lagged dependent variable to lie between 
the OLS estimate which is biased upwards and the fixed-effect estimate which is biased downwards 
(Bond 2002).  
4. Empirical analysis 
We begin the empirical analysis by estimating Eq. (1) using three different methods: OLS, FE and system 
GMM. The dependent variable is country Gini index of net income. All regressions include period 
dummies and we account for heteroscedasticity by employing robust standard errors. Table 1 presents the 
regression results. Columns (1)-(2) report the OLS and FE estimates of our model. With respect to our 
key variable of interest, we find that the variable IPR is negatively correlated with income inequality 
which is contrary to the findings of theoretical literature on IPRs and income distribution. However, as 
discussed above, OLS and FE regressions can provide inconsistent estimates owing to reasons such as 
endogeneity, dynamic panel bias and omitted variable bias. Therefore, we focus mainly on system GMM 
results of Table 1. As we discussed earlier, system GMM, if valid, should produce a coefficient estimate 
of lagged Net Income Gini lying between the OLS and FE estimates. Indeed, we find this to be the case in 
our results. Also, the Arellano Bond (AB) test and Hansen test could not reject the null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation and instrument validity. We choose to treat IPR, FDI, lagged Net Income Gini and log 
of per capita GDP as endogenous variables with lags upto 4th period as instruments. We treat Inflation and 
Schooling as pre-determined variables. As suggested by Roodman (2009a), we collapse the instrument set 
to reduce the number of moment conditions in order to avoid overfitting bias due to instrument 
proliferation. Also, since the estimated standard errors of the two step GMM estimates tend to be 
negatively biased, we eliminate the bias by using Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction by using 
two-step robust GMM (Windmeijer, 2005; Roodman, 2009b). Also, Difference-in-Hansen statistics (not 
reported) show that all groups of instruments for endogenous variables are exogenous. Therefore, we 
attach our highest reliability on the system GMM results reported in Column (3) of Table 2.1.  
From Column (3), we find that negative association between IPR and income inequality as per OLS and 
FE results of Columns (1)-(2) turns statistically significant. This result is in stark contrast to the findings 
of Adams (2008). Strengthening of IPRs does not worsen the income distribution but instead reduces 
disparities. We check consistency of this finding by introducing an interactive dummy (IPR*Developed 
Dummy) in our model. The interactive dummy IPR*Developed dummy checks for any differential impact 
of IPRs on income distribution in developed countries vis-à-vis developing countries. The coefficient on 
IPR remains significantly negative. However, there exists no significantly different income distributional 
consequences of strengthening on IPRs on developed countries (see Column 4 of Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 IPRs and Income Inequality 
Dependent variable :  Net   Income Gini 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed Effects System GMM System GMM 
     
 Lagged Income Gini  0.915*** 0.623*** 0.707*** 0.693*** 
 (0.021) (0.046) (0.089) (0.099) 
IPR -0.347 -0.448 -1.081** -1.097** 
 (0.282) (0.303) (0.478) (0.510) 
Log of per capita GDP -0.031 2.728** -0.818 -0.123 
 (0.233) (1.259) (0.964) (1.121) 
Trade Openness -0.001 -0.001 -0.015** -0.017** 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) 
FDI 0.025 -0.003 0.143 0.131 
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 (0.062) (0.058) (0.137) (0.129) 
Schooling 0.230 0.197 0.131 0.152 
 (0.139) (0.356) (0.888) (0.876) 
Inflation -0.000 0.001** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
IPR*Developed dummy    0.007 
    (0.599) 
Developed dummy    -1.876 
    (1.907) 
Constant 3.306 -9.004 22.734** 18.114* 
 (2.068) (11.109) (9.388) (9.607) 
     
R-squared 0.948 0.504   
Time dummies YES YES YES YES 
Hansen test    0.332 0.327 
AB test    0.173 0.158 
Number of instruments   36 38 
Number of countries  60 60 60 
Observations 318 318 318 318 
Notes: The results reported for the Hansen test and AB test are the p-values of the null hypothesis of the            
appropriate set of instruments and no second-order correlation respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Developed dummy =1 for high income countries, 0 otherwise. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
To test the robustness of our results, we introduce additional covariates – political rights, civil liberties 
and government consumption to our baseline specification. Column (1)-(2) of Table 2.2 reports results of 
the extended specification. Inclusion of additional covariates does not alter the main finding of IPRs 
having a significantly negative impact on income distribution. We undertake a second type of robustness 
check in which we take Gross Income Gini index as dependent variable in place of Net Income Gini 
index. Replacing Net Income Gini with Gross Income Gini reveals a negative coefficient on IPR akin to 
prior findings but significance on IPR disappears in one specification (Column 3 of Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 IPRs and Income Inequality – Robustness Tests 
Dependent Variable Net Income Gini Gross Income Gini 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES System GMM System GMM System GMM System GMM 
     
Lagged Income Gini 0.709*** 0.720*** 0.739*** 0.715*** 
 (0.084) (0.088) (0.076) (0.079) 
IPR -1.072* -1.031 -0.563 -0.831* 
 (0.537) (0.660) (0.549) (0.475) 
Log of per capita GDP -1.202 -1.290 0.206 -0.173 
 (1.031) (1.080) (0.977) (0.877) 
Trade Openness -0.017** -0.019** -0.008 -0.012 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
FDI 0.190 0.194 0.071 0.082 
 (0.133) (0.159) (0.111) (0.097) 
Inflation 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Schooling 0.557 0.640 0.003 -0.386 
 (0.853) (0.832) (0.867) (0.844) 
IPR*Developed dummy  0.219  0.699 
  (0.639)  (0.519) 
Government Consumption -0.033 -0.026 0.156** 0.177** 
 (0.089) (0.079) (0.063) (0.068) 
Political Rights 0.660* 0.736* 0.423 0.516 
 (0.370) (0.408) (0.451) (0.458) 
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Civil Liberties -0.951 -1.053 -0.437 -0.655 
 (0.657) (0.807) (0.723) (0.680) 
Developed dummy  -0.758  -0.949 
  (2.065)  (1.767) 
Constant 25.718*** 25.669*** 10.668 16.743* 
 (8.905) (9.231) (8.030) (8.549) 
     
Time dummies YES YES YES YES 
Hansen test  0.327 0.327 0.327 0.327 
AB test  0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 
Number of instruments 38 38 38 38 
Number of countries 60 60 60 60 
Observations 318 318 318 318 
Notes: The results reported for the Hansen test and AB test are the p-values of the null hypothesis of the            
appropriate set of instruments and no second-order correlation respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Developed dummy =1 for high income countries, 0 otherwise. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The theory postulates that stronger patent rights can increase wage inequality by increasing the return to 
R&D and the wages of R&D workers, who are generally employed as skilled labor (Cozzi and Galli 
2009). On the contrary, we find that strengthening of IPRs leads to a decline in income inequality in most 
of the specifications. It needs to be analysed further the channels through which strengthening of IPRs can 
narrow down income differences. 
As for the control variables, we find that FDI is associated with higher income inequality (albeit not in a 
statistically significant way). Empirical studies done in the past have provided mixed evidence on the 
relationship between income inequality and FDI. Choi (2006) finds that the increase in the FDI intensity, 
measured by inward, outward and total FDI stock as a percentage of GDP, increases the income 
inequality. Beer (1999) also reports a positive correlation between FDI and income inequality whereas 
Sylwester (2005) finds that there is no strong positive association between FDI and changes in income 
inequality in LDCs over the time period 1970-1989. But, one of the reasons for this result may be that 
FDI inflows did not play a significant role in the economies of the LDCs during the earlier time period 
considered. The average annual FDI inflows flowing to LDCs were only 0.43% as a percentage of GDP 
during the period of 1980-89. The average annual FDI inflows to LDCs increased to 1.62% during the 
period 1990-1999.19 It is only in the 1990s that financial globalization and capital mobility have assumed 
greater importance for developing countries’ economies. Owing to this, FDI did not register any 
significant effect on the distribution of income.  
Our variable for trade openness is found to be significantly and negatively correlated with income 
inequality in most of the model specifications, suggesting that increased integration into the world 
economy improves the distribution of income in countries. Trade openness can have mixed effects on 
income distribution depending on relative factor abundance and productivity differences across countries, 
and the extent to which individuals obtain income from wages or capital. Besides raising skill premium, it 
could also increase real wages by lowering (import) prices. At the same time, increased trade flows could 
lower income inequality in developing economies by increasing demand and wages for abundant lower-
skilled workers (Dabla-Norris et al 2015). Calderon and Chong (2001) assert that the volume of trade 
(openness) affects long run distribution of income. They find that the composition of exports also matters 
as primary commodity exporting countries, of which most are developing ones, are associated with an 
increase in  income inequality, while manufacturing goods exporting countries, of which most are 
developed, are found to experience a  decline in income  inequality. 
 
                                                          
19 Own calculations based on data taken from UNCTADSTAT. 
(http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx). Data accessed on 20 Feb, 2015. 
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 Our results suggest that Inflation which proxies for macroeconomic environment of a country has an 
insignificant role in raising income inequality. Bearing in mind that a positive sign in the corresponding 
coefficient of an explanatory variable indicates a worsening in the distribution of income we find that, 
with respect to our core controls – log of per capita GDP is negatively associated with income inequality 
and schooling appears to widen income disparities in a statistically insignificant way. 
 
  5. Conclusion 
Theoretical literature argues that IPRs tend to raise income inequality by generating a more skewed 
distribution of wages. The underlying notion is that stronger IPRs increase the demand for skilled labor 
force as it raises the return on R&D activities. This causes a relative increase in skilled labor wages, 
creating a wage bias in favor of skilled labor against unskilled labor, thus aggravating income inequality 
within a country. This paper empirically investigates the relation between IPRs and income distribution. 
This paper finds that strengthening of IPRs reduces income disparities within a country implying that 
income distributional consequences of strengthening IPRs are not that distortionary as suggested by 
theory. However, it needs to be analysed in detail the channels through which IPRs reduce income 
disparities in a country. 
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Annexure A: Sample of Countries  
 
Developed  Developing   
Australia 
Austria 
Canada 
Chile 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherland 
New Zealand 
Poland 
Portugal 
Singapore 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
United States 
 
Bangladesh 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Jordan 
Malaysia 
Malawi 
Mexico 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
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Annexure B. Construction of the Ginarte and Park IPR Index 
1 Coverage                       YES                         NO 
 
 
Patentability of pharmaceuticals 1/8 0 
 
 
Patentability of chemicals 1/8 0 
 
 
Patentability of food 1/8 0 
 
 
Patentability of surgical products 1/8 0 
 
 
Patentability of microorganisms 1/8 0 
 
 
Patentability of utility models 1/8 0 
 
 
Patentability of software 1/8 0 
 
 
Patentability of plant and animal varieties 1/8 0 
 
     2 Membership in international treaties                      YES                          NO 
 
 
Paris convention and revisions 1/5 0 
 
 
Patent cooperation treaty 1/5 0 
 
 
Protection of new varieties (UPOV) 1/5 0 
 
 
Budapest treaty (microorganism deposits) 1/5 0 
 
 
Trade-related intellectual  property rights(TRIPs) 1/5 0 
 
     3 Duration of protection                       Full                    Partial 
 
  
1                      0<ƒ<1 
 
     4 Enforcement mechanism              Available        Not   available
 
 
Preliminary(pre-trial) injunctions 1/3 0 
 
 
Contributory infringement 1/3 0 
 
 
Burden of proof reversal 1/3 0 
 
     5 Restrictions on patent rights     Does not exist                       Exists 
 
 
Working requirements 1/3 0 
 
 
Compulsory licensing 1/3 0 
 
 
Revocation of patents 1/3 0 
        
 
where ƒ is the duration of protection as a fraction of 20 years from the date of application or 17 years from 
the date of grant(for grant based patent systems).Overall score for patent rights index: sum of points under 
(1)-(5).Source: Park,W.G. (2008) 
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